Editorial | Regulations for BWCs

While there has been much debate over how efficiently the police deploy the body-worn cameras (BWC) they presently own – and when a full rollout of the equipment will happen – very little has been said about the regulations governing their use.

If regulations are already in place, they must be made public for analysis and review. If there are none, a full and transparent conversation must begin now between all stakeholders to develop world-class protocols – for the benefit of the constabulary and citizens.

This is a matter of urgency, given that the constabulary already possesses 750 BWCs that are deployed in public order policing; has 1,000 more on order; and is committed to a full, but phased, roll-out of the system to all officers involved in operational duties. Which, in total, would be around 8,000.

More than a year ago, Police Commissioner Kevin Blake reported that the technological backbone was being developed to accommodate the use of BWCs.

“We have been working over the past two to three years building up that infrastructure, strengthening our ... data centre [and] ensuring that our network communications are adequate, so that we can properly manage the products from these body-worn cameras,” Dr Blake said in August 2024.

What, however, is not clear are the operational and legal frameworks that govern the existing cameras and if, or how, these will change as the system expands.

This is important.

MAINTENANCE OF INTEGRITY

The call by human-rights groups, and the police oversight body INDECOM, for the wider use by cops of BWCs, especially during planned operations, is not founded in frivolity Their insistence is as much to protect the police from unfounded allegations of excessive use of force and extrajudicial killings, as it is to discourage overreach and misconduct by officers.

The latter are claims too, often levelled against cops as operational homicides by the police have returned to an upward spiral in recent years. This includes a more than 75 per cent rise (231 deaths so far) during the first nine months of 2025, compared to the same period last year.

Usually, more than 40 per cent of police killings happen on planned operations, for which officers presumably strategise before they are undertaken. These operations account for a small fraction of police interaction with citizens.

Notably, INDECOM (which investigates all shootings by, and allegations of abuse against, the police) consistently laments that in all the incidents of police killings it has investigated in the years since the constabulary has had BWCs, none was captured on video. In the handful of cases where officers wore BWCs, they were not switched on, ostensibly because the cops did not know how to operate them.

Systems have to be in place to ensure that the presence and availability of body-worn cameras add value to policing, while helping to build public trust in the constabulary.

So, at the most basic level, police officers have to be trained in the use of BWCs. Then there must be clear and specific protocols, set out in formal, legally binding regulations, on their use.

It is desirable then that Parliament’s imprimatur be placed on this regime, and that the maintenance of integrity be guaranteed by an independent body. If not a new one, which would be preferred, then an upgraded, reoriented and strengthened Police Civilian Oversight Authority.

With respect to the protocols governing BWCs, Jamaica need not reinvent the wheel. There are many jurisdictions where police have long used body-worn cameras. Jamaica can just pinch the most robust of these regimes, or from a combination of them.

ACCESS TO STORED DATA

Among the specific regulatory requirements that The Gleaner recommends, though, is that the BWCs must be activated at the start of every engagement by the police with citizens, who should be advised that they are being video recorded, notwithstanding that they should be so alerted by the device’s blinking activation light.

On special or covert operations, when there may be concerns that blinking lights might tip-off suspects and compromise missions, there must be authorisation by a named senior officer for a deactivation of the lights. There, however, should be a return to normal operating mode as soon as it is safe to do so. The time of this must be recorded. In other words, the system must have operational flexibility, backed by strict accountability. It must be noted that cameras can continue to record even while the blinking lights are deactivated, so long as the device has not been turned off.

Recordings from BWCs should be kept for a minimum of a year, but longer in specific circumstances – such as when there are disputes between the police and citizens relating to potential data captured by cameras, or if an officer faces, or is likely to face, disciplinary action in which the video might be important to his or her vindication. Or further, it is necessary for the authorities to complete the disciplinary process.

Access to the stored data should be vigorously overseen by the independent monitoring body. Preferably, officers, except in the most extreme cases, ought not to be allowed to review video recordings before they have written and submitted their incident reports. This is to prevent reports being written to conform with video recordings.

Complainants, or their representatives, must have the right to review relevant video, but in a context that does not compromise other people’s privacy or jeopardises national security.

Citizens must have full access to technical specifications of BWCs videos that will be tolerated by the court’s rules governing their use in legal matters.

With respect to where and how the data from BWCs are stored, people must be assured that their privacy is protected and what recourse they have against the constabulary and the State if this is breached.

Clearly, there is much to discuss and agree upon.